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Frames of Reference and the "Tum to 
Remedy" in Facial Challenge Doctrine 
by KEVIN C. WALSH' 
Introduction 
The Roberts Court persists in using the terms "facial challenge" and 
"as-applied challenge" as if there are two discrete types of constitutional 
"challenge" and a trans-substantive doctrine that governs when each type 
of challenge is appropriate. As Richard Fallon's analysis has revealed, 
however, the terms do not denote two distinct categories of constitutional 
litigation. 1 All constitutional challenges to statutes are "as-applied" in that 
they assert that a statute may not validly be enforced against a particular 
litigant.2 Facial challenges are those as-applied challenges that invite 
assessment of the enforceability of a statute with respect to all of its 
applications. 
Facial challenge doctrine as it currently stands is a grab bag of high-
level principles bearing on the propriety of invalidating a statute in all its 
applications. It has been developed and deployed across a range of 
substantive areas of law. This allows the Court, for example, to import a 
statement about the propriety of facial invalidation from a case about 
congressional power into a case about a state law regulating election 
procedures.3 On occasion, this causes the Court to overlook relevant 
differences among various strands of substantive constitutional law that 
govern whether a statute is unconstitutional in all its applications. 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Villanova University School of Law. 
1. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party 
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000). 
2. See id. at 1324 ("[T]here is no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to as-
applied, litigation. Rather, all challenges to statutes arise when a particular litigant claims that a 
statute cannot be enforced against her."). 
3. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008) 
(citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 ( 1960)); id. at 1191 (citing Sabri v. United States, 
541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004)). 
(667] 
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This Symposium on Facial Challenges in the Roberts Court provides 
an opportunity to chart a path toward greater doctrinal coherence in light of 
the Court's most recent uses of the distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges. In his contribution to this Symposium, David Faigman 
makes two claims that I address in this response. The first of Professor 
Faigman's claims is descriptive: "the debate over facial versus as-applied 
challenges is merely a subcategory of the pervasive issue concerning 
defining the proper frame of reference for empirical questions arising under 
the Constitution.'"' As Professor Faigman uses the term, a "frame of 
reference" is "the lens through which concrete cases are adjudicated.''5 It 
determines "whether a constitutional provision raises factual issues, and the 
kinds of facts that are relevant to particular constitutional inquiries. "6 
Professor Faigman's description captures an important insight into the role 
played by facial challenge doctrine in constitutional adjudication. In some 
cases in which the Court deploys facial challenge doctrine, however, the 
frame of reference is set entirely by substantive law. In those cases, facial 
challenge doctrine influences how the Court disposes of the case within the 
substantive-law frame of reference. Consider, for example, the Court's 
rejection of a facial challenge by political parties to Washington State's 
election scheme. 7 Associational freedom case law provided the frame of 
reference, which required proof of voter perception of the relationship 
between parties and candidates in Washington's scheme. 8 Such proof was 
not available because the scheme had not yet been implemented, and facial 
challenge doctrine foreclosed speculation about how voters would perceive 
the scheme when it was implemented.9 As this example shows, defining 
frames of reference is not the exclusive function of facial challenge 
doctrine. 
Faigman' s second claim is prescriptive: "the proper frame of reference 
in deciding constitutional cases should be an explicit component of 
constitutional interpretation.'' 10 I agree. It is desirable for courts to 
4. David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases: 
Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 631, 634 (2009). 
5. Id. at 658. A clear illustration that Faigman provides is the way in which McCleskey v. 
Kemp framed the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to focus on 
case-by-case proof of individualized discrimination rather than statistical proof of systemic 
discrimination. Id. at 651. 
6. Id. 
7. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195-96. 
8. Id. at 1193. 
9. Id. at 1193-94. 
10. Faigman, supra note 4, at 658. 
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intelligently establish the frame of reference for each constitutional ruling. 
I disagree, however, that "the Court surreptitiously manipulates the relevant 
frame to serve substantive objectives." 11 The Court's frame shifting is 
typically not surreptitious, and any "manipulation" that does occur consists 
of adjustments to the availability of facial challenges in light of changes in 
underlying substantive law. Whether such adjustments are appropriate 
depends on an assessment about the best way of implementing the 
underlying substantive law. 
The Court's approach to facial challenges to laws regulating abortion 
provides a good example of this phenomenon. Constitutional challenges to 
abortion laws have given rise to sparring spanning the last decade or so 
over the propriety of facial invalidation. 12 Professor Faigman views the 
Court's most recent decision in this line-Gonzales v. Carhart, which 
upheld the federal ban on partial-birth abortions against a facial 
challenge13 -as a case study in how not to decide the appropriate frame of 
reference for constitutional adjudication. My evaluation is more positive. 
Although certain particulars of Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court are 
confounding, its insistence on as-applied adjudication going forward is 
entirely appropriate for establishing discrete health-based exceptions to the 
general partial-birth abortion ban. The decision properly extends the 
approach employed in Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court 
the immediately preceding Term in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
Northern New England. 14 
The incremental remedial approach of Ayotte-in which the Court 
required the consideration of narrower relief as an alternative to facial 
invalidation-is a significant improvement over the blunt facial approach 
of Stenberg v. Carhart. 15 Ayotte reflects a "tum to remedy" that bypasses 
the stale debate over the verbal formulas of United States v. Salerno and 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Following 
Ayotte, courts should understand facial challenges as those that seek 
11. Id. at 634. 
12. See, e.g., Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996) 
(Justice Stevens respecting the denial of certiorari); id. at 1176 (Justice Scalia dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). This debate has been framed to require a choice between applying the 
principles enunciated in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) or Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
13. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
14. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofN. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
15. In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000), the Court held that the absence of 
a statutory health exception rendered Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortions facially invalid. 
The absence of this exception was not the only flaw, but would have been sufficient by itself to 
require facial invalidation. See id. at 929-30. 
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invalidation of a statute in all of its applications. Courts should first ask as 
a matter of substantive law whether the applicable constitutional test 
requires such across-the-board invalidation. If only some applications are 
unconstitutional, courts should consider an injunction prohibiting the 
unconstitutional applications as a preferred alternative to facial 
invalidation.16 This "tum to remedy" allows for greater calibration of the 
output of constitutional adjudication to the underlying constitutional 
protection in any given case than a forced choice between verbal formulas 
that purport to describe in a trans-substantive way the "heavy burden" to be 
borne by facial challengers. 
The first part of this response discusses how facial challenge doctrine 
has functioned in a few recent Roberts Court cases in which it served a 
function other than to define the frame of reference. The second part 
defends the Court's current approach to facial challenges to abortion laws 
and suggests that it provides a promising approach to assessing the 
propriety of facial invalidation more widely. 
I. Operation Within a Frame of Reference 
In response to Professor Faigman's claim that "the debate over facial 
versus as-applied challenges is merely a subcategory of the pervasive issue 
concerning defining the proper frame of reference for empirical questions 
arising under the Constitution,"17 this Part discusses recent cases in which 
facial challenge doctrine operated as a way of disposing of a challenge 
within a frame of reference set by substantive law rather than as a tool for 
defining the frame of reference itself. This discussion shows that facial 
challenge doctrine consists of more than a subcategory of the issue of 
defining frames of reference for constitutional adjudication. It provides a 
layer of analysis that the Court sometimes chooses to emphasize when 
deciding a constitutional claim within a frame set by substantive law. 
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party was 
an associational freedom challenge to Washington State's election scheme, 
which permitted candidates to self-identify with a political party on the 
election ballot, regardless of whether the party had selected that candidate 
16. Ayotte also requires a determination of whether partial invalidation is consistent with 
legislative intent, which it describes as "the touchstone for any decision about remedy." Ayotte, 
546 U.S. at 330. For reasons that 1 will discuss in future work, this "legislative intent" 
qualification is problematic. For present purposes, however, my objections to this use of 
legislative intent are not pertinent. 
17. Faigman, supra note 4, at 634. 
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as its nominee. 18 The Washington State Republican Party, Washington 
State Democratic Central Committee, and Libertarian Party of Washington 
State claimed that this scheme violated their freedom of association "by 
usurping [their] right to nominate [their] own candidates and by forcing 
[them] to associate with candidates [they do] not endorse."19 The plaintiff 
parties filed suit before the scheme had operated in any election, and before 
the ballot had been designed.20 
Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for an unusually configured Court. 21 
This opinion rejected the parties' challenge because it turned on 
speculation about whether voters would be confused by candidates' party-
preference designations.22 The constitutional objections, in turn, rested on 
speculation because the Court interpreted its associational freedom 
precedents to require speculation. The majority interpreted these cases to 
mean that the unrebutted association of a candidate with a party on a ballot 
did not necessarily impinge on associational freedom as a matter of law. 
Justice Thomas appealed to prior case law that he characterized as 
reflecting "faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves 
about campaign issues."23 In light of this case law, the possibility of voter 
confusion-unsupported by an evidentiary record reflecting how the statute 
would be implemented-was insufficient to ground a successful facial 
challenge.24 
18. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1187-89 (2008). 
This scheme replaced an earlier "blanket primary" scheme virtually identical to the one struck 
down in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000). The distinctive feature 
of a "blanket primary'' is that "any person, regardless of party affiliation, may vote for a party's 
nominee." Id. at 576 n.6. 
19. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1189. The Washington State Grange became involved 
in the litigation through intervention as a defendant. 
20. Id.atll94. 
21. Id. at 1187. Justice Thomas 's opinion for the Court was joined by all justices other than 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Scalia authored a dissent that Justice Kennedy joined. See 
id. at 1197-1203 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a 
concurring opinion whose sole function was to respond to Justice Scalia's dissent. See id. at 
1196-97 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
22. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion) ("At bottom, respondents' objection to 1-872 is that voters 
will be confused by candidates' party-preference designations. Respondents' arguments are 
largely variations on this theme. Thus, they argue that even if voters do not assume that 
candidates on the general election ballot are the nominee of their parties, they will at least assume 
that the parties associate with, and approve of, them. This, they say, compels them to associate 
with candidates they do not endorse, alters the message they wish to convey, and forces them to 
engage in counterspeech to disassociate themselves from the candidates and their positions on the 
issues."). 
23. Id. (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986)). 
24. Id. at 1193-94. Justice Thomas observed that the state's ballot had not yet been 
designed, and he reasoned that it was necessary to "ask whether the ballot could conceivably be 
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Joined by Justice Kennedy in dissent, Justice Scalia urged the Court to 
recognize as a matter of law that "thrusting an unwelcome, self-proclaimed 
association upon the party on the election ballot itself is ... destructive of 
the party's associational rights."25 Rather than demand evidence of voter 
perception from the parties, Justice Scalia interpreted the Court's 
associational freedom precedents as turning on the expressive associations' 
own assessments of how forced association would affect their ability to 
advocate their positions.26 
Clearly, the majority and the dissent in Washington State Grange 
operated within different empirical frames of reference: the majority's 
frame of reference was voter perception, while the dissent' s was the ballot 
itself. But the difference between the frames of reference was a function of 
differing understandings of underlying substantive law-First Amendment 
law regarding freedom of association-not of facial challenge doctrine. 
The majority's frame of reference required proof of voter perception of a 
ballot that had not yet been designed, a matter that was necessarily 
speculative at the time. Having thus characterized the constitutional 
challenge as requiring speculation, the Court then invoked facial challenge 
doctrine to foreclose that speculation and shut down the challenge. 
Facial challenge doctrine played a similar role, although with less 
justification, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.27 At issue was 
an Ohio statute requiring voters to present government-issued photo 
identification in order to vote. 28 The Court upheld the requirement by a 
six-to-three vote. The six votes in the majority were split between an 
printed in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of widespread voter confusion and with it the 
perceived threat to the First Amendment." Id. at 1194. Justice Thomas had no difficulty 
conceiving of a ballot design that, along with public education, would prevent voter confusion. 
See id. ("For example, petitioners propose that the actual 1-872 ballot could include prominent 
disclaimers explaining that party preference reflects only the self designation of the candidate and 
not an official endorsement by the party. They also suggest that the ballots might note preference 
in the form ofa candidate statement that emphasizes the candidate's personal determination rather 
than the party's acceptance of the candidate, such as "my party preference is the Republican 
Party."). Having deflated the prospect of voter confusion, the opinion concluded that the parties' 
"arguments about forced association and compelled speech fall flat." Id. (footnotes omitted). 
25. Id. at 1200 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26. Id. at 1201 ("[C]ontrary to the Court's suggestion, it is not incumbent on the political 
parties to adduce evidence that forced association affects their ability to advocate for their 
candidates and their causes. We have never put expressive groups to this perhaps-impossible 
task. Rather, we accept their own assessment of the matter." (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
27. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
28. Id. at 1613. 
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opinion authored by Justice Stevens29 and an opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia.30 
According to Justice Stevens, the challengers asked the Court "to 
perform a unique balancing analysis that looks specifically at a small 
number of voters who may experience a special burden under the statute 
and weighs their burdens against the State's broad interests in protecting 
election integrity."31 The Court could not perform that balancing analysis 
in this facial challenge, according to Justice Stevens, because "on the basis 
of the evidence in the record it is not possible to quantify either the 
magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the portion of the 
burden imposed on them that is fully justified."32 Apart from this 
evidentiary failure, Justice Stevens reasoned that the fact that it was a facial 
challenge required the challengers to bear a heavier burden than they 
apparently would have had to bear if the complaint had not been a facial 
challenge.33 In increasing the "weight" that the challengers needed to bear, 
Justice Stevens relied on Washington State Grange.34 
In contrast, nothing in Justice Scalia's opinion turned on the 
characterization of the case as presenting a facial challenge. Nor did 
Justice Scalia's approach require any balancing because under his approach 
individual impacts of a generally applicable law are irrelevant.35 Instead, 
the Court's task was to determine whether the burdens imposed by a law 
are "severe" rather than "nominal," or mere inconveniences.36 Similarly, 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
31. Id. at 1622 (majority opinion). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 1621-22 ("Given the fact that petitioners have advanced a broad attack on the 
constitutionality of SEA 483, seeking relief that would invalidate the statute in all its applications, 
they bear a heavy burden of persuasion."). 
34. Id. at 1622 ("Only a few weeks ago we held that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit had failed to give appropriate weight to the magnitude of that burden when it sustained a 
preelection, facial attack on a Washington statute regulating that State's primary election 
procedures. Our reasoning in that case applies with added force to the arguments advanced by 
petitioners in these case."). Justice Stevens noted, seemingly gratuitously, that "petitioners have 
not demonstrated that the proper remedy-even assuming an unjustified burden on some voters-
would be to invalidate the entire statute." Id. at 1623. 
35. Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Indiana photo-identification law is a generally 
applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation, and our precedents refute the view that 
individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the burden it imposes."). 
36. Id. at 1624. Laws that impose a severe or discriminatory burden are subject to strict 
scrutiny, while the remainder are subject to "a deferential 'important regulatory interests' 
standard." Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992)). 
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neither of the dissenting opinions attributed any significance to the "facial" 
nature of the claim. 37 
As in Washington State Grange, the differing frames of reference in 
play in Marion County Election Board resulted from substantive law, not 
from the fact that plaintiffs brought a facial challenge. Not only was the 
opinion authored by Justice Stevens the only one of four opinions to invoke 
facial challenge doctrine, but it also appears as if the empirical frame of 
reference would have been the same for Justice Stevens regardless of 
whether the complaint was styled "facial" or "as-applied." In the case of 
an as-applied challenge, the challenger presumably would have been 
required to make the same showing as the Marion County Election Board 
challengers: that the burdens imposed on him or her were not outweighed 
by "the State's broad interests in protecting election integrity."38 The 
difficulties Justice Stevens identified in performing such a balancing 
analysis are difficulties endemic to that type of doctrinal test, none the 
greater because of the relief that the challengers sought. The only function 
seemingly served by Justice Stevens's invocation of facial challenge 
doctrine was to make it more difficult for the challengers to prevail. 
The speculation-foreclosing and burden-enhancing functions of facial 
challenge doctrine in Washington State Grange and Marion County 
Election Board, respectively, were entirely absent from the Court's 
decision of yet another facial challenge to an election-related law decided 
in the October 2007 Term. In Davis v. FEC, 39 the Court held 
unconstitutional the "Millionaire's Amendment" to the Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance Reform Act ("BCRA"), which raised the contribution 
limits for candidates facing wealthy opponents who spend more than 
$350,000 of their personal funds on a campaign.40 
The challenger in Davis sought to have the asymmetrical contribution 
limits declared unconstitutional.41 The Court described the claim as a 
37. Justice Souter objected that Justice Stevens demanded too much precision when 
assessing the challengers' evidence. Id. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Petitioners, to be sure, 
failed to nail down precisely how great the cohort of discouraged and totally deterred voters will 
be, but empirical precision beyond the foregoing numbers has never been demanded for raising a 
voting-rights claim."). Justice Souter also faulted Justice Stevens for not "insist[ing] enough on 
the hard facts" when assessing the State's arguments. Id. at 1628. Justice Breyer concluded that 
the statute was unconstitutional because it imposed a disproportionate burden on voters without 
statutorily valid identification-a conclusion that he was able to reach because of the record 
developed in the litigation. Id. at 1643-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. at 1622 (majority opinion). 
39. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
40. Id. at 2765-67. 
41. Id. at 2767-68. Jack Davis was an unsuccessful candidate for Congress in 2004 and 
2006 who spent over $1 million of his own funds in 2004 and over $2 million of his own funds in 
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"facial challenge," and the Court's holding-that "imposing different 
contribution and coordinated party expenditure limits on candidates vying 
for the same seat is antithetical to the First Amendment"42 -rendered the 
differential limits unconstitutional across the board. Yet the Court never 
invoked the "heavy burden" language seen in Marion County Election 
Board or the "judicial restraint" language of Washington State Grange. 
Instead, facial invalidation flowed directly from the substantive First 
Amendment test that the Court applied. 
Although Washington State Grange, Marion County Election Board, 
and Davis can all be described as facial challenges related to election law, 
they each dealt with different areas of substantive constitutional law. That 
is why it is unexceptionable that facial challenge doctrine made no 
appearance in Davis. The First Amendment test applied in that case was 
simply not the kind of test that required the sort of evidence whose absence 
doomed the political parties' challenge to Washington's election scheme. 
Yet, Justice Stevens's use of facial challenge doctrine from Washington 
State Grange in Marion County Election Board reveals that at least some 
members of the Court do not appreciate that the relevant considerations 
bearing on adjudication of a facial challenge are not entirely trans-
substantive. Justice Stevens seemingly reasoned that because both cases 
were about election law and both were facial challenges, the reasoning in 
Washington State Grange about what a heavy burden the challengers must 
bear "applies with added force to the arguments" advanced by the 
challengers in Marion County Election Board.43 This loose connection 
between the two cases makes little sense. One challenge was rooted in 
associational freedom and the other in equal protection. Whether these two 
different bodies of law should be implemented through the same record-
based frame of reference requires some argument or explanation. This is 
not to deny that the high-level principles that make up facial challenge 
doctrine may appropriately apply across a range of substantive areas.44 The 
2006. Id. at 2767. In 2006, Davis filed suit seeking a declaration that the "Millionaire's 
Amendment" was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement by the Federal 
Election Commission. Id. 
42. Id. at 2774. 
43. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621-22 (2008). 
44. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190--
91 (2008) (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofN. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (challenge 
to state law requiring parental notification for a minor's abortion as violating the right to privacy); 
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (challenge to federal criminal statute regarding 
misuse of federal funds as exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause); United 
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (challenge to federal criminal statute prohibiting interference 
with voting as exceeding Congress's enforcement power); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 
U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (challenge to contract between Tennessee Valley 
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point, rather, is that these principles do not necessarily apply every time 
that a Court is asked to invalidate a statute in all of its applications. 
Depending on the underlying substantive law, none, some, or all of these 
principles may be fittingly invoked. 
Any review of the use of facial challenge doctrine by the Roberts 
Court to date would be incomplete without discussing the series of three 
Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutionality of BCRA's 
restrictions on certain broadcast advertisements funded by corporate 
general treasuries. Each of these cases addressed the constitutionality of 
BCRA section 203, which expanded previously existing restrictions on 
broadcast advertisements funded by corporate general treasuries that 
mention a candidate within certain times before an election involving that 
candidate.45 Taken together, these cases illustrate how the complex web of 
facial challenge doctrine can entangle the justices in distracting and 
abstract arguments about the relationship between facial and as-applied 
challenges, to the detriment of clear argument about substantive-law 
divisions. 
In McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court upheld section 203 against a 
facial attack, concluding that the ban was not overbroad and 
constitutionally could be applied to cover express advocacy and its 
Authority and Alabama Power Company as exceeding Congress's power); Yazoo & Miss. Valley 
R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912) (challenge to state law mandating prompt 
settlement of certain claims for goods damaged during railroad shipment as violating due 
process)). 
45. Prior to BCRA, the restrictions on expenditures for broadcast advertisements from the 
general treasuries of corporations were limited to expenditures supporting "express advocacy." 
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003). BCRA section 203 extended the restrictions to 
encompass all "electioneering communications," regardless of whether they expressly advocated 
the election or defeat of a particular candidate. See id. at 189-90. BCRA's definition of 
"electioneering communication" covers any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that: 
(!) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; 
(II) is made within-
( aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by 
the candidate; or 
(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of 
a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by 
the candidate; and 
(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate other than President or 
Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. 
2 U.S.C.A. § 434(t)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2003). A communication is "targeted to the relevant 
electorate" if it "can be received by 50,000 or more persons" in the district or State the candidate 
seeks to represent. Id. § 434(t)(3)(c). 
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functional equivalent.46 In Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC ("WRTL I"), the 
Court unanimously held that McConnell's rejection of facial invalidity did 
not foreclose an as-applied challenge.47 In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life 
("WRTL II"), the Court held that section 203 was unconstitutional as 
applied to three advertisements Wisconsin Right to Life had developed and 
sought to run during a prior election.48 
The difficulty with reconciling these cases is that the standard for as-
applied challenges set forth in Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in WRTL II 
undercuts the no-overbreadth holding of McConnell.49 The common 
ground among the justices that there was room after McConnell for some 
case-by-case adjudication is revealed in the unanimous holding of WRTL I. 
That much makes sense: Rejection of a facial challenge is not equivalent to 
a holding of across-the-board validity, but rather a rejection of across-the-
board invalidity. That a statute is not invalid in all its applications is 
consistent with the statute being invalid in some of its applications. 
However, applicable substantive constitutional law provides limits to this 
mode of reasoning. McConnell's holding of no overbreadth rested on a 
determination that the set of unconstitutional applications was not 
"substantial" when "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate 
sweep."50 If the standard for identifying unconstitutional applications set 
46. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93. 
47. Wis. Right to Life v. FEC (WRTL I), 546 U.S. 410, 410 (2006) (per curiam). 
48. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL II), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). The Court was split as to 
the outcome, and the five justices in the majority were further split in their rationale. Chief 
Justice Roberts, in an opinion joined by Justice Alito, reasoned that section 203 could be 
constitutionally applied only to advertisements that were susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as advocacy for or against a particular candidate. Id. at 2667. Justice 
Scalia, in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, rejected the Roberts/Alito test and 
advocated the overruling of McConnell's holding of facial validity. Id. at 2680-84 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). These three justices would have held section 203 facially unconstitutional because it 
was overbroad. Id. at 2683-84. The four dissenting justices concluded not only that section 203 
was constitutional as applied to Wisconsin Right to Life's advertisements, but also that the 
Court's holding to the contrary effectively overruled McConnell. Id. at 2698-99 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
49. As Justice Scalia noted, seven of the nine justices believed that the constitutional 
reasoning in WRTL II could not be reconciled with the constitutional reasoning underlying the 
holding of facial constitutionality in McConnell. Id. at 2684 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) ("The claim that § 203 on its face does not reach a substantial 
amount of speech protected under the principal opinion's test-and that the test is therefore 
compatible with McConnell-seems to me indefensible. Indeed, the principal opinion's attempt 
at distinguishing McConnell is unpersuasive enough, and the change in the Jaw it works is 
substantial enough, that seven justices of this Court, having widely divergent views concerning 
the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, agree that the opinion effectively overrules 
McConnell without saying so. This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation."). 
50. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
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forth in WRTL II sweeps in a "substantial" amount of applications "in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," then WRTL II and 
McConnell cannot be reconciled. Whether that is the case, however, has 
nothing to do with facial challenge doctrine, and everything to do with First 
Amendment law and the test for overbreadth. 
Against this backdrop, it is possible to see how facial challenge 
doctrine sowed confusion in the WRTL II debate over whether the standard 
set forth in Chief Justice Roberts's opinion was reconcilable with 
McConnell. 51 In addition to dueling with the other justices over the 
meaning of McConnell to show that this earlier case did not settle what 
constitutional test governed an as-applied challenge, Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that the earlier decision "could not have settled" that issue.52 The 
reason for this purported impossibility, according to. Chief Justice Roberts, 
is that "[ c ]ourts do not resolve unspecified as-applied challenges in the 
course ofresolving a facial attack."53 
The flaw in Chief Justice Roberts's argument is that the resolution of a 
facial attack sometimes does entail resolution of unspecified as-applied 
challenges. For example, a decision that rejects an overbreadth challenge 
on the ground that the statute covers no constitutionally protected speech 
necessarily rejects every as-applied challenge premised on the claim that 
51. The question that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took to be open in WRTL II 
was what constitutional test to apply in deciding the constitutionality of section 203 as applied to 
any given advertisement. WRTL JI, 127 S. Ct. at 2664 (concluding that "McConnell did not adopt 
any test as the standard for future as-applied challenges). The district court, too, thought that 
McConnell did not establish a constitutional test for as-applied challenges. See Wis. Right to Life 
v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 206 n.16 (D.D.C. 2006) ("The as-applied challenge here ... puts 
squarely before a court for the first time the issue of whether three particular ads are genuine issue 
ads, thereby forcing this Court to decide whether to limit its assessment of the purpose and effect 
of those ads to the information contained within the ads' four comers. Thus, since the McConnell 
Court was spared such a choice in dealing with the facial challenge it confronted, its references to 
purpose and effect are of limited significance in this matter today."). The four dissenting justices 
disagreed that this was an open question. According to Justice Souter's dissent, McConnell left 
open only "the possibility of a 'genuine' or 'pure' issue ad that might not be open to regulation 
under § 203." WRTL JI, 127 S. Ct. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting). On this approach, any ad 
"reasonably understood as going beyond a discussion of issues" would be constitutionally 
proscribable. Id. ("While we left open the possibility of a 'genuine' or 'pure' issue ad that might 
not be open to regulation under § 203, we meant that an issue ad without campaign advocacy 
could escape the restriction. The implication of the adjectives 'genuine' and 'pure' is 
unmistakable: if an ad is reasonably understood as going beyond a discussion of issues (that is, if 
it can be understood as electoral advocacy), then by definition it is not 'genuine' or 'pure."'). The 
other three justices read McConnell to have adopted a different test: "whether the advertisement is 
the 'functional equivalent of express advocacy.'" Id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
52. Id. at 2670 n.8 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
53. Id. 
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the proscribed speech is constitutionally protected. 54 As discussed above, 
whether any as-applied challenges remain open after the rejection of a 
facial challenge does not tum on facial challenge doctrine alone but on how 
the challenged statute fares under the substantive constitutional test applied 
in the earlier challenge. Facial challenge doctrine cannot provide a full 
defense to the charge of sub rosa overruling. 
II. The Promising "Turn to Remedy" 
Notwithstanding the difficulties with some uses of facial challenge 
doctrine, the Roberts Court has already laid the foundation for a more 
fruitful approach to facial invalidation. It can be found in the Court's 
pivotal but neglected decision in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern 
New England, in which Justice O'Connor authored the opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 55 In this, her last opinion for the Court, Justice 
O'Connor altered the framework for assessing the appropriateness of facial 
invalidation of abortion-related laws that lack a health exception and 
pointed the way toward a more promising approach to assessing the 
propriety of facial invalidation more generally. This approach focuses on 
the remedy of facial invalidation and requires the Court to examine the 
conditions under which that remedy is appropriate. This contrasts with the 
focus of the prior approach-which it has not yet entirely replaced-on the 
"weight" of the burden to be carried by one bringing a facial challenge. 
This Part explains the approach taken by the Court in Ayotte and answers 
Justice Ginsburg's and Professor Faigman's objections that the Court's 
approach to facial invalidation in Gonzales was inconsistent with precedent 
and is normatively misguided. 
The lead question presented in the Ayotte petition for certiorari asked 
the Court to address the standard for facial challenges to abortion 
restrictions.56 The First Circuit had facially invalidated New Hampshire's 
54. See, e.g., Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1981) 
(describing the challenged ordinance as "a law that does not reach constitutionally protected 
conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test"). 
55. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofN. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
56. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Defendant-Appellant, Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320 (No. 04-
1144), 2005 WL 474024 •1 ("Did the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals apply the 
correct standard in a facial challenge to a statute regulating abortion when it ruled that the undue 
burden standard cited in Planned Parenthood of S[outheastern] P[ennsylvannia] v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 876--77 (1992) and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) applied rather than 
the 'no set of circumstances' standard set forth in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 
(1987)?"). The Court's decision to grant certiorari in this case with respect to the Salerno versus 
Casey debate was puzzling. There were two factors weighing in favor of a grant. First, the 
decision below did identify a 6-1 split. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 
53, 57-58 (lst Cir. 2004) (identifying 6-1 circuit split in favor of the Casey standard, consisting 
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law requiring parental notification for a minor to obtain an abortion.57 The 
lead constitutional defect in the statute, according to the court of appeals, 
was that it lacked an explicit health exception.58 The First Circuit 
understood the constitutional requirement of a statutory health exception as 
a requirement of legislative precision: a statute that lacks an explicit health 
exception restricts access to abortions that women are constitutionally 
entitled to obtain, and is therefore entirely unconstitutional. 59 This 
legislative-precision-based understanding of the need for a health exception 
came directly from Stenberg v. Carhart, in which the Court invalidated 
Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortions because, among other reasons, it 
lacked a health exception. 60 
of the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits versus the Fifth Circuit); id. at 58 
n.4 (identifying the Fourth Circuit as "sympathetic" to the Fifth Circuit's approach). Second, that 
decision also weighed in on the split, aligning First Circuit law with the majority side of the split. 
Id. at 58 ("We agree with these six circuit courts that the undue burden standard-proposed as a 
standard 'of general application' by the Casey plurality, and twice applied to abortion regulations 
by a majority of the Court-supersedes Salemo in the context of abortion regulation." (internal 
citations omitted)). But there was a countervailing reason weighing against a grant. The First 
Circuit's resolution of the split was immaterial to its ultimate disposition of the case for lack ofa 
statutory health exception. That is, although the First Circuit concluded that the "undue burden" 
standard of Casey governed, the court never determined whether the statute posed an undue 
burden. See id. at 65. 
57. Heed, 390 F.3d at 65. The First Circuit's invalidation was "facial" in three senses: first, 
the Court ordered invalidation in response to a challenge styled as a "facial challenge." See 
Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.N.H. 2003) ("The 
plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional on its face."). Second, the 
invalidation turned solely on an examination of the statute on its face, along with other provisions 
of state law, in light of the constitutional requirement that the text contain a health exception. See 
Heed, 390 F.3d at 62 ("The New Hampshire Act contains no explicit health exception, and no 
health exception is implied by other provisions of New Hampshire law or by the Act's judicial 
bypass procedure. Thus, the Act is facially unconstitutional."). And third, the invalidation 
resulted in the unenforceability of the statute in all of its applications. See id. at 65 (describing 
the Act as "in its entirety unconstitutional" and affirming the district court's injunction against its 
enforcement). 
58. The court of appeals drew the necessity for a statutory health exception from Casey and 
Stenberg, even though the Court's earlier decision in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 
(1990), upheld a state parental notification requirement that did not contain an explicit health 
exception. Heed, 390 F.3d at 58 ("[T]the Supreme Court has . . . identified a specific and 
independent constitutional requirement that an abortion regulation must contain an exception for 
the preservation of a pregnant woman's health." (citing Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929-30)); see also 
id. at 60 ("[T]he Hodgson Court did not consider a challenge to that statute's lack of a health 
exception, and even if it had, the subsequent decisions in Casey and Stenberg would nevertheless 
require a health exception in the instant case." (footnote omitted)). In addition to holding the 
statute unconstitutional because it lacked a health exception, the Court also held that the statute's 
life-of-the-mother exception was too narrow. Id. at 62-64. 
59. See id. at 59--00. 
60. See id. at 60. 
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The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the judgment ordering facial 
invalidation and remanded for consideration of "relief more finely 
drawn."61 The Court purported to leave its abortion precedents intact and 
to address a question of remedy only. 62 Yet Ayotte unmistakably changed 
substantive constitutional law governing health-based exceptions to 
abortion regulations. The Court in Stenberg v. Carhart had interpreted 
Casey to require that the statute itself contain a health exception. 63 Under 
this approach, the constitutional flaw inhered in the statute insofar as it 
criminalized constitutionally protected conduct. The switch in substantive 
law in Ayotte came in Justice O'Connor's description of the constitutional 
flaw to be remedied: "When a statute restricting access to abortion may be 
applied in a manner that harms women's health, what is the appropriate 
relief?"64 This description altered the nature of the constitutional 
requirement for a health exception from the text-focused constitutional 
requirement of Stenberg v. Carhart to an application-focused requirement 
in Ayotte. 
Having framed the constitutional problem as inhering in certain 
applications rather than in the statute itself, the First Circuit's facial 
invalidation was overly "blunt"65 given that "[ o ]nly a few applications of 
New Hampshire's parental notification statute would present a 
constitutional problem."66 This factual reality was irrelevant to the First 
Circuit's facial invalidation because it understood the constitutional 
requirement as one of legislative precision to be assessed by reference to 
61. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofN. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 321 (2006). 
62. Id. at 323 ("We do not revisit our abortion precedents today, but rather address a 
question of remedy: If enforcing a statute that regulates access to abortion would be 
unconstitutional in medical emergencies, what is the appropriate judicial response?"). 
63. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-31. 
64. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 330. 
66. Id. at 331. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court acknowledged the shift from 
Stenberg, in which the Court "held Nebraska's law unconstitutional because it lacked a health 
exception." Id. (A more precise description of Stenberg would be that the Court "held 
Nebraska's law [entirely] unconstitutional because it lacked [an explicit] health exception [in 
statutory text.]"). Justice O'Connor explained this departure from Stenberg with the assertion 
that "the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and we did not contemplate, relief more finely 
drawn." Id. This assertion is "artfully phrased," for while "the parties in Stenberg did not ask for 
more finely drawn relief, ... an anticus brief filed by Feminists for Life did." Stuart Buck, The 
Buck Stops Here (January 20, 2006), http://stuartbuck.blogspot.com/search?q=ayotte. The "more 
finely drawn" relief advocated in this amicus brief did not relate to the health exception, but 
rather to the application of the challenged statute to D&E abortions. See Brief for Feminists for 
Life of America et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914 
(No. 99-830), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/99-830/99-830fo l/ 
brief.pdf. 
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statutory text. Yet under the Court's new application-based approach, 
consideration of this factual reality was essential to the proper disposition 
of the challenge. 
Ayotte not only shifted the doctrinal test from looking at the text of the 
statute to how the statute would actually operate. The decision also 
implicitly changed the frame of reference for facial invalidation as 
previously set forth in Casey. The Court in Casey held that Pennsylvania's 
spousal notification requirement was facially invalid because it unduly 
burdened a "large fraction" of women. 67 The denominator of this 
"fraction" did not consist of "all women" or "all pregnant women" or all 
women "seeking abortions." Rather, it consisted of those women for whom 
the spousal notification requirement would be "an actual rather than an 
irrelevant restriction," i.e., the approximately one percent of women 
seeking abortions "who do not wish to notify their husbands of their 
intentions and who do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions to the 
notice requirement."68 The Court in Ayotte did not purport to apply 
Casey's "large fraction" test, but instead assessed the proportion of 
unconstitutional to constitutional applications by reference to all pregnant 
minors seeking abortions.69 Had the Court followed Casey in Ayotte, it 
would have had to affirm the First Circuit's facial invalidation because the 
denominator of the "large fraction" would have been only those pregnant 
minors for whom the absence of a health exception would be "an actual 
rather than an irrelevant restriction."70 
Ayotte, therefore, answers Professor Faigman's criticism that the 
Court's approach to facial invalidation in Gonzales was inconsistent with 
Casey and Stenberg.71 While it is true that the approach to facial 
invalidation in Gonzales cannot be reconciled with these earlier cases, that 
inconsistency is a function of Ayotte, the most recent and most directly on-
point precedent regarding the absence of a statutory health exception from 
a law regulating abortion. 
The Court's decision to uphold a federal ban on partial-birth abortions 
in Gonzales reversed contrary decisions by the Second, 72 Eighth, 73 and 
67. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992). 
68. Id. at 894-95. 
69. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328 ("In some very small percentage of cases, pregnant minors, like 
adult women, need immediate abortions to avert serious and often irreversible damage to their 
health."). 
70. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. 
71. Faigrnan, supra note 4, at 649-50. 
72. Nat'! Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006). Unlike the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuit decisions, this Second Circuit decision was not directly before the Supreme Court 
on certiorari in Gonzales v. Carhart. Moreover, unlike the Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions, 
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Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. 74 Writing for a five-to-four majority, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that "[t]he Act is not invalid on its face where 
there is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to 
preserve a woman's health, given the availability of other abortion 
procedures that are considered to be safe altematives."75 Although the 
decision rejected the facial challenge, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the 
Court held open the possibility that the federal partial-birth abortion ban 
could at some later point be held unconstitutional with respect to some 
applications "if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances 
a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure 
prohibited by the Act must be used."76 
Justice Ginsburg charged in her dissent that the Court erred by 
departing from Casey's treatment of the "denominator" issue. But Justice 
Ginsburg's dissenting opinion does not acknowledge the inconsistency 
between Ayotte and Casey on precisely this issue. The dissenting opinion 
instead describes Ayotte as a case in which the facial challenge was 
"entertained,"77 a description that is accurate but misleading given that 
Ayotte vacated the lower court's facial invalidation.78 
Professor Faigman develops the criticism that Gonzales "squarely 
contradicts" the approach to facial invalidation taken in Casey.19 Like 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, however, Professor Faigman's article does not 
explain why the Court should have ignored Ayotte in favor of its earlier 
approach. Certainly, the Court bears significant blame for this state of 
affairs for not acknowledging in Ayotte its departure from Casey. It is 
likely that at least some of the justices who joined in the unanimous 
this decision ordered additional briefing on the question of remedy based on its recognition that 
Ayotte may require a remedy other than facial invalidation. Id. at 281. The court then stayed its 
order pending the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Carhart and ordered supplemental 
briefing on the impact of the Court's decision in that case after it was decided. See Nat'/ 
Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2007). It subsequently ordered that judgment 
be entered for the government after the challengers conceded that Gonzales v. Carhart foreclosed 
their facial challenge. See Nat'/ Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 224 Fed. Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
73. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005). 
74. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006). 
75. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
78. In fairness to Justice Ginsburg, the reference to Ayotte as a case in which a facial 
challenge was "entertained" came in response to Justice Kennedy's assertion that "these facial 
attacks should not have been entertained in the first instance." Id. at 1638 (majority opinion). It 
is difficult to know precisely what to make of this statement given that the Supreme Court in 
Gonzales v. Carhart not only "entertained," but also rejected, the facial challenge. 
79. Faigman, supra note 4, at 650. 
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opinion in Ayotte did not intend a departure from Casey, not the least of 
whom would be the author of both, Justice O'Connor.8° Further, Justice 
Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Gonzales does not treat Ayotte as 
having displaced Casey even though the analysis above concludes that it 
has. If Ayotte does displace Stenberg's use of Casey with respect to the 
absence of a health exception, however, then the charge of inconsistency 
cuts both ways, requiring justification for choosing the old over the new. 
In addition to inconsistency with precedent, Professor Faigman 
condemns Gonzales for failing to contemplate the "constitutional costs" 
that its insistence on as-applied adjudication imposes on women affected 
by the absence of a health exception. 81 Professor Faigman states that the 
Court's approach requires that "a woman who confronted potential health 
complications with a second trimester abortion . . . would have to petition a 
court to enjoin application of the statute to her."82 Because the "structural 
impediments" to such a lawsuit are great, "it is quite unlikely that many as-
applied challenges will be brought."83 Consequently, Professor Faigman 
concludes that "by moving the frame of reference from an at-large 
determination to a case-by-case determination, the Court made it impossible 
for women to vindicate a right that the Court itself said existed: the right of a 
woman to choose a pre-viability abortion without undue interference by the 
government. "84 
This practicability objection rests on an unduly narrow understanding 
of just what alternatives the Court's opinion leaves open. It is not 
necessary after Gonzales for an individual woman seeking an abortion to 
bring suit. Nothing in that decision purports to eliminate the third-party 
standing of abortion doctors to assert their patients' rights. More 
importantly, an as-applied challenge would not need to be limited to the 
circumstances of an individual woman, but could encompass sets of 
potential patients defined by reference to constellations of medical 
circumstances rendering the partial-birth procedure the safest in light of 
those circumstances.85 All of which is to say that a pre-enforcement, as-
80. See David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges 
and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 701 n.57 (2009) ("The various sections of 
the Joint Opinion in Casey were not separately attributed, but researchers using the papers of 
Justice Blackmun have since confirmed what everybody suspected at the time-that Justice 
O'Connor wrote the section striking down the spousal notification provision."). 
81. Faigman, supra note 4, at 663. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 
(2007) (No. 05380), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcri 
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applied challenge would look very much like the facial challenges that gave 
rise to Gonzales. The key difference is that the as-applied challenge would 
focus only on a subset of potential statutory applications, rather than all of 
them. The issue would be whether the Act constitutionally could be 
applied in certain circumstances, not whether it constitutionally could be 
applied at all. 86 
I agree with Professor Faigman that the Court should make "a frank 
assessment of the consequences of insisting on as-applied challenges" and 
either abandon its insistence or "identify a mechanism that would [give] 
some substance to such challenges."87 But there is strong evidence that the 
Court undertook just such an assessment in the course of deciding 
Gonzales. The Solicitor General's acknowledgement "that preenforcement, 
as-applied challenges to the Act can be maintained"88 came in response to 
pointed questioning from Justices Breyer and Kennedy at oral argument. 89 
And Justice Ginsburg's questioning elicited the further explanation from 
Solicitor General Clement that an as-applied challenge could be brought 
with respect to a range of potential applications defined by the medical 
circumstances that abortion doctors themselves could identify as 
appropriately calling for a partial-birth abortion as the safest alternative.90 
Presumably, it is a challenge of this sort that the Court intended to leave 
open "to protect the health of the woman if it can be shown in discrete and 
well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in 
which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used."91 Faigman offers 
no reason to believe that such a challenge could not be brought. Without 
addressing the inadequacy of the alternative that the Court left open, it 
overstates the objection to assert that "Kennedy's opinion suggesting as-
applied challenges as a bona fide alternative is either self-delusion of the 
highest magnitude or a crass political maneuver designed to dispose of all 
pts/05-380.pdf ("[M]y understanding is that even when you talk about an idiosyncratic condition, 
I mean, the doctors who perform these abortions perform, you know, hundreds of them a year and 
they can identify those conditions and they have names for those conditions and I think it would 
be amenable to bringing a more as applied challenge." (argument of Solicitor General Paul D. 
Clement)). 
86. See id. at 22 ([W]hat you would have in mind is a doctor who had standing under this 
Court's abortion jurisprudence would come in and say, look, in my practice I've seen that this 
procedure would be particularly useful in dealing with preeclampsia or placental previa or some 
condition."). 
87. Faigman, supra note 4, at 664. 
88. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument 
Transcript at 21-23, Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05380)). 
89. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-23, Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05-380). 
90. Id. at 23-24. 
91. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
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of these cases, notwithstanding substantial health risks created for women, 
without owning-up to that reality."92 
The extent to which Gonzales is best understood as an application of 
the Ayotte approach is certainly debatable. The opinion in Gonzales speaks 
in terms of the "heavy burden" imposed on parties bringing a facial 
challenge, and offers Salerno's "no set of circumstances" test and Casey's 
"large fraction" test as two alternatives for describing "[ w ]hat that burden 
consists of in the specific context of abortion statutes."93 With this framing 
of the problem, the Court threatens to undo the progress that it made in 
Ayotte away from the misguided Salerno versus Casey "debate." It also 
threatens to prolong the use of facial challenge doctrine as an obstacle to 
clear argument about frames of reference rooted in substantive 
constitutional law. 
The Court recognized in Ayotte that its prior approach had mandated a 
too-hasty facial invalidation in Stenberg. Although the Court's accounting 
for its insistence on as-applied adjudication in Gonzales is not entirely 
satisfying, the reason for this is not inconsistency with precedent but the 
failure explicitly to embrace the better of the two strands of precedent 
available to it. The advantage of Ayotte over Stenberg is that Ayotte asks 
the right question: what justification is there in this case for declaring a 
statute invalid in all its applications and enjoining it in its entirety? 
Because the New Hampshire legislature repealed the parental 
notification statute at issue in Ayotte before the district court could rule on 
more finely tailored relief,94 it is unknown whether a partial injunction 
against all, but only, the unconstitutional applications of New Hampshire's 
parental notification statute would have been feasible or consistent with 
legislative intent. But it certainly seems correct that such tailored relief 
ought to be considered before the more potent remedy of total 
invalidation.95 The process of considering more tailored relief would allow 
courts to take into account on a case-by-case and doctrine-by-doctrine basis 
the factors that Professor Faigman appropriately contends ought to be 
considered: the practicability of meaningful case-by-case analysis, the 
constitutional values at risk in adopting or failing to adopt an at-large 
92. Faigman, supra note 4, at 663. 
93. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1640. 
94. See Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270-71 
(D.N.H. 2008). 
95. Cf Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and Vagueness: 
Guiding Principles for Constitutional Interpretation, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 456-61 
(advocating the use of "classical avoidance supported by an injunction" as a remedy to be 
considered by federal courts facing overbreadth and vagueness challenges). 
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decision, and the costs associated with at-large decisions versus case-by-
case adjudication.96 
Conclusion 
Facial challenge doctrine not only defines the frame of reference in 
some cases, but also operates in other cases to influence the likelihood that 
a challenge will succeed within a frame set entirely by substantive law. A 
persistent difficulty bedeviling the deployment of facial challenge doctrine 
is the insufficient attention paid to the interdependence of that doctrine and 
the underlying substantive constitutional law that it implements. This 
difficulty can be met by reorienting the doctrine from one that focuses on 
the weight of a challenger's burden to one that focuses on the propriety of 
facial invalidation as a remedy. The Court's adoption of this approach in 
Ayotte is promising, but the Court has yet to follow through in a way that 
allows the Ayotte approach to live up to its promise. 
96. See Faigman, supra note 4, at 659. 
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